Eighty
percent of defined benefit (DB) plan sponsors have accelerated funding, largely due to increasing Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) fees and
the prospect of lower corporate taxes, according to results of the Mercer/ CFO
Research 2017 Risk Survey, “Adventures in Pension Risk Management.”
“Two
years ago, mortality assumptions dominated as the main influencing factor. Today, PBGC premiums and market
conditions have emerged as most cited reasons. Companies feel that the time is
right to reduce or eliminate their pension funding shortfalls.” says Matt
McDaniel, partner, Mercer. “Continuing the trend we found in our 2015 survey,
the migration toward pension risk transfer and de-risking carries on at an
accelerated pace.”
Specifically,
respondents say they are now contributing more than the minimum level of
funding to their DB plans either because they want to reach specific thresholds
or because they aim to fully fund the plan over a shorter period of time than
regulations require. PBGC premiums tripled between 2011 and 2016 and are
expected to quadruple by 2019—which has had a notable effect on plan sponsors.
When
asked about reasons why they either have increased funding or would consider
doing so, 40% of respondents decided to increase funding to reduce the cost of
future PBGC premiums, and nearly 33% are also considering funding for that same
reason. According to Mercer, that combined total of nearly 73% is a notable
increase from the 2015 survey results, which found only about 60% citing PBGC
premiums as a deciding factor to fund above requirement.
Nearly
60% of survey respondents intend to terminate their plans within the next ten
years. Most have a funding deficit they must overcome first. “Sponsors who want
to develop a successful pension exit strategy have to make sure they create a
process that evaluates and changes the asset allocation, lowering pension risk
as frozen plans move closer to termination.” says McDaniel. “DB plan sponsors
should weigh considerations such as the plan’s objective, their time horizon,
the magnitude of their obligations and the state of the economy.”
NEXT: De-Risking Accelerates
More
than eight in ten respondents say they either have a “dynamic de-risking
strategy in place” (42%) or “are currently considering one” (40%), citing a
desire to avoid volatility in their financial statements as a main reason. More
than half of respondents (55%), however, say they struggle with finding enough
internal resources to manage their pension plan. As such, 52% of those surveyed
delegate some or all investment execution to a third party through an outsourced
chief investment officer (OCIO) model.
Nearly
75% of Mercer’s survey respondents say they have already offered lump-sum
payments to certain participants since 2012—up from 59% from the 2015 Mercer
CFO survey findings. About 50% of all respondents consider it likely that their
companies will take some form of lump-sum, risk-transfer action in the next
couple of years—for many of these sponsors, this will be a second or third
lump-sum offer.
A
significant number of sponsors have implemented an annuity buyout for some
pension participants, where an insurer assumes responsibility for the sponsor’s
retirement liabilities. Among survey respondents, more than half (55%) have
either completed such an annuity buyout or are considering it.
Many
companies are held back by the misconception that such annuities are either
“expensive” (37%) or “very expensive” (25%). Specifically, these respondents
estimate that the cost of an annuity would require their pensions to post a projected
benefit obligation (PBO) of more than 110%. However, Mercer’s experience shows the
majority of transactions occur between 100% and 110% of PBO.
The survey collected
175 responses, mostly from CFOs, CEOs and finance directors, with 80% of
responses representing DB pension plan assets of between $100 million and $5
billion. More than half (53%) of respondents represent companies with annual
revenues of between $500 million and $5 billion. Respondents come from a broad
range of industries, with the most sizeable clusters in aerospace/defense and
business/professional services.
The Right Course: What Can 403(b) Plan Sponsors Learn from Litigation?
A review of fiduciary governance and the liability insurance policy can help 403(b) plan sponsors steer clear of the litigation whirlwind hampering the industry today.
Fiduciaries of 403(b) plans will have to pay extremely
close attention to recordkeeping fees and investment options to avoid getting
caught in a whirlwind of 403(b) lawsuits.
The ongoing 403(b) plan litigation surrounding a handful of
major universities has many plan sponsors wondering whether their
institutions might be the next target. However, several steps can be taken to prevent a lawsuit—and
to
establish defenses in the event one arises.
David Kaleda, a principal in the fiduciary responsibility practice at Groom Law Group in Washington, D.C., tells PLANADVISER that now is
a critical time for plan sponsors to review fiduciary governance structures and
to make sure they know exactly who is a fiduciary to the plan.
“It’s important you make sure you have good processes
and procedures in place to minimize fiduciary risk, especially when it comes to
investment selection and what’s paid to service providers,” says Kaleda.
In fact, high-cost investments and excessive revenue
sharing fees seem to lie at the heart of allegations drawn
against these plans.
Common accusations include offering expensive
investment options when similar, low-fee options are available; offering higher cost share
classes when lower priced shares for the same funds are available;
allowing payment of excessive revenue sharing by offering investments
proprietary to the recordkeeper or its affiliates; and allowing payment of
overall excessive recordkeeper fees.
For example, plaintiffs accuse Yale University and New
York University of charging participants excessive fees because both plans use
multiple recordkeepers. It’s important to note that nothing in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) requires a plan to have a sole recordkeeper.
Still, it’s important for plan sponsors to know how
revenue sharing works, who is getting paid, what they are getting paid, and
weather those fees are reasonable and in the participants’ best interests.
“Revenue sharing does not have to be inherently bad,”
explains Kaleda. “Where fiduciaries have a problem is not understanding how
much they are paying and what they are getting.”
In the case of NYU, its Faculty Plan retains Vanguard
and TIAA-CREF as recordkeepers, and it offers proprietary funds from both firms
as investment options. Inclusion of one investment option required NYU to also
maintain TIAA-CREF as a recordkeeper and offer another specific investment
option. Plaintiffs argued that this breached fiduciary duty and “loyalty,” because
it prevented fiduciaries from independently assessing the prudence of each
investment.
A federal judge dismissed
most claims against NYU, and ruled this contractual
arrangement on its own was not sufficient to support a breach of loyalty claim.
The judge said that to make that case, plaintiffs
would have to “allege plausible facts supporting an inference that the
defendant acted for the purpose of providing benefits to itself or someone
else.” In other words, plaintiffs could not prove that NYU retained these
recordkeepers for the benefit of either party without first considering the
participants’ best interests—a task that should be paramount to every fiduciary.
The judge also dismissed claims that NYU breached
fiduciary duty by offering higher-cost retail share classes of certain funds
when lower-cost institutional share classes were available. Once again, nothing
in ERISA requires plans to offer the cheapest share classes. But, everything
involving fees charged to participants must be reviewed with the utmost
scrutiny, for reasonableness.
In NYU’s case, the judge noted that retail shares can
offer participants certain advantages over institutional shares, such as a
higher degree of liquidity. In this sense, the judge ruled it was not clear participants
would gain from lower expense ratios at the expense of lower liquidity, so
inclusion of institutional shares “does not always demonstrate an unwise choice.”
“It’s not an automatic loss that you have retail share
classes instead of institutional,” says Kaleda. “Where you have a problem is if
you can’t justify why you had one or the other, particularly if it is more
expensive.”
Plaintiffs also argued the plan offered too many
investment options—more than 100—which confused participants and diminished the
plan’s bargaining power in securing cheaper investments. The judge noted that
nothing in ERISA requires plans to limit investments, even if it enhances their
ability to offer cheaper investments.
NEXT:
Claims plaintiffs successfully argued, and how
As fiduciaries under ERISA, plan sponsors must
consistently “monitor and remove imprudent investments.” And whether fees are
excessive or not is relative to the quality of services provided.
For example, plaintiffs argued that NYU imprudently
maintained investments in the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account.
They demonstrated these funds had consistent 10-year track records of
underperformance compared to similar, lower-cost funds. The judge ruled
plaintiffs plausibly supported this claim. She also found their claims of excessive
recordkeeping fees to be sufficient, because evidence demonstrated that experts
in the recordkeeper industry found their administrative fees to far exceed those
of similarly-sized and organized plans.
Kaleda adds that annuities in particular have often
come under fire in these lawsuits.
“Plaintiffs in these cases seem to be biased against
insurance as an investment option,” says Kaleda. “All we talk about these days
is lifetime
income protection, so there could be reasons to have
annuity options. But the way these complaints are written suggests that you
shouldn’t have these.”
John Morahan, senior vice president of Risk Strategies
Company in Chicago, tells PLANADVISER this may have to do with the complexity
behind annuities. “I think that many of the employees
don’t really understand these products,” he says. “And I don’t think they are
explained properly, so that leaves fiduciaries at risk of breaching fiduciary
duty to employees.”
Considering projections of low
returns for the long-term and reports of growing longevity
risk,
proper education around these products could benefit participants as well as fiduciaries.
Nonetheless, even taking the most careful steps as a
fiduciary won’t guarantee you’ll be spared from litigation. Here is where fiduciary
liability insurance can pay off.
NEXT:
Setting up the right defenses
Fiduciary liability insurance is designed to protect
insured parties against claims alleging the breach of their fiduciary duties to the
plan or allegations that they committed errors in plan administration. And
while having this type of insurance is common among large plans, protections
and lack thereof can vary significantly from policy to policy.
Morahan says plan sponsors should pay close attention
to the wording around claims made against non-indemnifiable individuals. These
would be fiduciaries who aren’t protected with potential reimbursement for
losses by existing insurance policies governing the university.
“Generally, there are limitations on a university’s
ability to indemnify individuals found liable in shareholders’ derivative suits,”
explains Morahan. “This means that insurance is the last line of defense. And
if there is a $25,000 insurance deductible, individuals considered fiduciaries
will need to pay this out of their assets.”
However, plans with zero-dollar deductibles for non-indemnifiable
claims are available.
“As the litigation against these large universities
works its way down to mid-size and smaller universities, these colleges may not
have the money to buy the right kind of limits,” says Morahan. “It’s important
that the fiduciaries facing non-indemnifiable claims have a zero dollar
deductible so they won’t have to pay plan losses out of their own pockets.”
Another area Morahan suggests scrutinizing is the
language surrounding personal conduct exclusions. Some policies won’t help
cover legal defenses against a specific claim such as one alleging dishonesty
or fraud.
“The language for these exclusions must be carefully
reviewed and negotiated,” suggests Morahan. “The objective is to make sure the
insurer defends the insured until there is a final non-appealable adjudication.
Many insurers use language that allows them to exit the defense of litigation
early.”
Universities should also make sure they understand how
the policy defines key terms like “insured,” who is protected under the policy;
“wrongful act,” what will it protect and what won’t it protect; and “loss,”
what has to happen for the plan to invoke coverage. In addition, it is key to make sure the right coverage
limits are set.
“Make sure the coverage amount is adequate,” suggests
Kaleda. “Talk to an insurance broker and make sure it covers the right people.”
This task will undoubtedly become more complicated as
the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule
undergoes implementation, even as provisions are being challenged and the rule
faces backlash
from President Donald Trump.
“A lot more providers that interact with your plan can
become fiduciaries because of the rule,” says Kaleda. “So many interactions
with a 403(b) plan are now investment advice. You might have people in your
benefits department that inherently become fiduciaries if they’re not careful.
Make sure that liability insurance policy is broad enough that it will cover
incidents where people you didn’t think were fiduciaries became one.”
“Plan sponsors need to pay better attention to who is
managing their retirement options and making sure they are putting best
practices in place,” Morahan concludes. “Pay attention to the fees embedded in
these plans, know who is being paid what. And if you’re paying one provider
differently than another, know why.”