California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris filed a
lawsuit against Standard & Poor’s (S&P) for inflating its ratings of
structured finance investments.
Harris says S&P’s actions caused
California’s public pension funds and other investors to lose billions of
dollars. The complaint alleges that the McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. and Standard
and Poor’s Financial Services LLC violated the False Claims Act and other state
laws by using a ratings process based on what senior executives described as
“magic numbers” and “guesses.”
Specifically, the complaint alleges
that, from 2004 to 2007, S&P systematically misrepresented to the public,
and to the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and the
California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), that its ratings of
structured finance securities were based on an independent, objective and
reliable analysis, and not influenced by S&P’s economic interests. In doing
so, S&P lowered its standards for rating securities to gain market share
and increase profits and violated the False Claims Act by making false
statements about the nature and risk of investments. The complaint also
describes the company’s efforts to suppress the development of new and more
accurate ratings models.
In mid-2007, the housing bubble
burst. After securities that S&P had deemed the least risky began
defaulting, S&P downgraded many residential mortgage backed securities
investments. The market collapsed, and of those securities issued in 2007, more
than 90% were downgraded to junk status. The two retirement systems lost
approximately $1 billion.
Attorney General Harris joined the
Department of Justice and 12 other states and the District of Columbia in
announcing lawsuits against S&P. However, California’s suit includes a
claim for triple damages, because when the state makes a purchase based on a
false statement, the defendant is responsible for the amount lost times
three.
The complaint can be downloaded from here, at the
bottom of the page.
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Poorly
performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added
to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee, according to “It
Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans.”
Veronika
K. Pool and Irina Stefanescu, both of Indiana University at Bloomington, and Clemens
Sialm of University of Texas at Austin and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the authors of the
paper, investigated whether executives from mutual fund families acting as
trustees of 401(k) plans play favorites with their own funds, and whether plan
participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices.
Executives
from mutual fund families often serve as trustees of defined contribution (DC)
plans, the authors noted, and play an active role in creating the menu of investment
options for the plan participants.
The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) requires trustees to be prudent
in making investment choices for their 401(k) clients, yet mutual fund trustees
have a competing interest to maximize investments in their own proprietary
funds. Little is known about whether and how these conflicting incentives
influence the menu of options in 401(k) plans, the paper said.
DC
accounts are a main source of retirement income for many beneficiaries, making
this potential conflict a concern, the authors said. Since retirement savings
compound over long time horizons, any inefficiency or trustee bias can
significantly affect the employees’ wealth at retirement and have larger
societal consequences as well.
To
investigate the favoritism hypothesis, the authors hand collected information
on the menu of mutual fund options in a large sample of DC plans for the period
1998 to 2009 from annual filings of Form 11-K with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The sample includes plans that are trusteed by representatives
from a mutual fund family as well as plans with non-mutual fund trustees.
(Cont’d…)
Same Fund,
Different Views
Most
401(k) plans in the sample that have a mutual fund trustee adopt an open
architecture, whereby investment options include not only funds from the
trustee’s family but from other mutual fund families as well.
An
interesting feature of the dataset is that a given fund often appeared on
several 401(k) menus administered by different trustees, appearing on some
menus as an affiliated or trustee fund, and on others as an unaffiliated or
non-trustee fund. The authors could then contrast how one fund could be viewed
across two different investment menus.
The
authors found that despite their fiduciary responsibilities, trustees have a
strong preference for their own funds. Trustee funds were less likely to be
removed from the plan across the board, the paper said. Moreover, the biggest
difference between how trustee and non-trustee funds are treated on the menu
occurs for the worst-performing funds, which have been shown to exhibit
significant performance persistence.
For
example, mutual funds ranked in the lowest decile based on past performance
(among the universe of funds in the same style category over the prior 36
months), are approximately two and a half times more likely to be deleted from
those menus on which they are unaffiliated with the trustee than from those
where they are affiliated with the trustee.
Similarly,
the authors found that trustees were substantially more likely to add their own
funds to the menu across all performance deciles. Trustee fund additions
exhibited lower prior performance than non-trustee additions, and the
probability of adding a trustee fund was less sensitive to performance than the
probability of adding a non-trustee fund.
Interestingly,
mirroring the authors’ results for deletions, they found that addition
probabilities were inversely related to performance among poorly performing
trustee funds.
(Cont’d…)
Can Participants
Make a Difference?
The
trustee’s tilt toward affiliated funds need not affect plan participants,
however, according to the paper. Although the investment opportunity set of the
plan is determined by the menu choices selected by the employer and the
trustee, participants can freely allocate contributions within the opportunity
set.
If
participants anticipate trustee biases or are simply sensitive to poor
performance, they can, of course, undo favoritism in their own portfolios by,
for instance, not allocating capital to poorly performing trustee funds.
In
order to investigate whether trustee favoritism has an impact on the overall allocation
of plan assets, the authors also examined the sensitivity of participant flows
to the performance of trustee and non-trustee funds. They discovered that
participants are generally not sensitive to poor performance and thus do not
undo the trustee bias, which, in turn, indicates that plan participants can be
affected by the trustee’s choices.
While
the evidence of favoritism is consistent with adverse trustee incentives,
trustees are also likely to have private information about their own proprietary
funds, the paper said. Therefore, the authors theorized
that it is possible trustees show a strong preference for these funds in
menu-altering decisions not because they are biased toward them, but rather,
due to positive information they possess about these funds.
To
investigate this possibility, the authors examined future fund performance. For
instance, if despite lackluster past
performance the decision to keep poorly performing trustee funds on the menu is
information driven, then they should perform better in the future.
They
found this is not the case: trustee funds that ranked poorly based on past
performance but were not delisted from the menu did not perform well in the
subsequent year. They estimated that on average they underperformed by
approximately 3.6% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. This figure is large in
and of itself, but its economic significance is magnified in the retirement
context by compounding. The results suggest that trustee bias has important
implications for the employees’ income in retirement.
The
subsequent performance of poorly performing affiliated funds indicates that
these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement
savers, the authors concluded.