Voya Wins Dismissal of Suit Over Advice Service Agreement

The lawsuit challenged fees Voya Retirement Advisors received when using Financial Engines to provide investment advice to retirement plan participants.

A federal judge has dismissed a lawsuit claiming Voya Financial and Voya Retirement Advisors (VRA) engaged in prohibited transactions in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) through a service arrangement with Financial Engines.

Plaintiff Lisa Patrico filed the lawsuit on behalf of all participants and beneficiaries of the Nestle 401(k) Savings Plan and all other similarly situated individual account plans. According to the complaint, the plan offers participants access to investment advice through VRA.

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Pursuant to the Nestle-VRA Agreement, VRA offers two investment advice programs—a self-service, online program called “Personal Online Advisor” and a managed account service called “Professional Account Manager.” Nestle pays VRA fees in association with the services. However, Financial Engines actually provides the advice under an agreement with VRA. Patrico alleges that VRA “provides no material services in connection with the advice program, and the only reason for structuring the advice service as being provided by [VRA] with sub advisory services by Financial Engines is to allow [VRA] to collect a fee to which it is not entitled.” She claims that, by structuring the investment advice program this way, VRA and the other Defendants breached their fiduciary duties and engaged in prohibited transactions in violation of ERISA.

U.S. District Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA Section 404 because the complaint fails to allege facts showing the defendants were ERISA fiduciaries with respect to their fees. She noted in her decision that the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that when a service provider that has no relationship to an ERISA plan is negotiating a contract with that plan, the service provider “is not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the terms of the agreement for [its] compensation.” According to Schofield, the rationale for this rule is that a service provider in such a situation “has no authority over or responsibility to the plan and presumably is unable to exercise any control over the trustees’ decision whether or not, and on what terms, to enter into an agreement.” She noted that Nestle was free to select a different investment advice service provider or none at all.

Schofield found the complaint also fails adequately to allege that defendants became ERISA fiduciaries with respect to their compensation after the Nestle-VRA Agreement was executed. Under the Nestle-VRA Agreement, VRA’s compensation for the program is a function of two factors—the number of participants with a balance in the plan and the total plan assets of participants in the program. “Neither VRA nor any other Defendant can control those factors; they depend solely on the Plan participants’ investment decisions,” she wrote in her decision.

Schofield also rejected the argument that the defendants controlled their compensation by controlling the proportion of the fee that went to Financial Engines, and in that regard were ERISA fiduciaries, saying Nestle exercised final authority over this arrangement and was free to reject it or seek better terms.

NEXT: Prohibited transaction and other claims dismissed

Schofield dismissed the prohibited transaction claim under ERISA Section 406(a) because the complaint fails to allege that any ERISA fiduciary had actual or constructive knowledge that the defendants were receiving allegedly excessive compensation for the investment advice program. She found the complaint fails to allege that any ERISA fiduciary caused the plan to pay VRA the fees prescribed by the Nestle-VRA Agreement with actual or constructive knowledge that the fees were excessive.

She reiterated that the defendants are not ERISA fiduciaries with respect to the fees, and said Financial Engines is not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the fees for the same reasons—namely that it does not have the requisite control over the amount of compensation it receives. Schofield pointed out that Nestle is a named fiduciary under the plan, but the complaint does not allege that Nestle knew the compensation under the Nestle-VRA Agreement was excessive, either overall or as to the portion retained by VRA.

The judge dismissed claims against defendants Voya Financial, Inc., Voya Institutional Plan Services, LLC and Voya Investment Management, LLC because the complaint fails to make specific allegations against them.

Schofield did give Patrico 21 days to file any motion to replead.

Fiduciary Compliance Remains a Squishy Concept

Content, context and presentation are now the important factors in determining whether a particular activity represents fiduciary advice—but that could change.

A recent webinar presented by Goodwin Procter offered extensive analysis of the ongoing implementation of the Department of Labor (DOL) fiduciary rule, which has greatly expanded the definition of fiduciary investment advice under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  

According to a team of Goodwin ERISA attorneys, the key to understanding the ongoing regulatory change is grasping the difference between the old “five-part test” formerly used to determine fiduciary status and the new blanket approach. Stated simply, the advisory industry is moving from an environment wherein it was the exception that a firm could not find a way to cite the five-part test to deny fiduciary liability into an environment in which practically anyone offering advice for compensation to retirement investors—including those purchasing products in individual retirement accounts (IRAs)—will immediately be deemed a fiduciary.

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The attorneys agreed that the DOL in the last 10 years or so had grown “incredibly frustrated” with the way its granular guidance about the five-part test, which it issued in good faith to help providers understand when they were acting as fiduciaries, was being aggressively used to undermine its otherwise broad-based policing authority of qualified retirement plans. That frustration strongly fueled the effort under the last Democratic presidential administration to establish a far stricter and more direct definition of fiduciary advice under ERISA.

Today the industry is left in a pretty confusing spot, given the fact that an anti-regulation Republican is in the White House and in command of the agency that is supposed to enforce the new fiduciary rule, which in fact has not even fully come into effect yet, as applicability dates for the rules various provisions stretch well into 2018.

And so the Goodwin attorneys urged advisers to continue to track the outstanding memorandum from President Trump, instructing a full review of the fiduciary regulations and exemptions. The fiduciary rulemaking could still be withdrawn or clarified in a substantial way, they warned. As one attorney stated, “it is not unreasonable in our mind to be hedging between different approaches right now, in terms of thinking about abandoning commission or moving down another path. As we have stressed, much of this is still subject to change.”

The attorneys suggested they are particularly interested to see how the “transition best interest contract (BIC)” period plays out. Right now, under the fiduciary rule transition period, advisers to retirement accounts are fiduciaries and they have to comply with the impartial conduct standards set out by ERISA; however they do not yet actually have to paper individual contracts to this effect with all their clients. This is important in cases where the advisory practice is continuing to assess compensation via commissions rather than flat fees for service.  

One attorney speculated that “we will have to wait and see whether the full BIC requirement including the contract comes into place. My theory, tentatively, is that the Trump administration could decide to maintain this middle ground transition standard where advisers can use commissions without papering enforceable contracts, so long as they make good-faith efforts to eliminate potential conflicts.” It would then seemingly be up to the DOL to pursue violators, rather than the plaintiffs’ bar

The attorneys concluded that, whatever the fiduciary future brings, firms will want to be thinking deeply about who on their staff is talking directly or indirectly to clients—and how this group can be kept up to speed on changing policies and procedures regarding the all-important distinction between education and advice under ERISA. “It’s not just the big firms with big call centers that may need to make changes,” one attorney warned. “Whatever your organization looks like, you need to make sure the people who are on your own end of the phone are up to speed about your approach.”

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