No-Load Shares Continue to Gain Ground in Mutual Fund Sales

Point-of-sale commissions continue to fade from the mutual fund sales process as advisers increasingly sell funds in fee-for-advice arrangements, according to a new study by Strategic Insight, an Asset International company.

Among long-term mutual funds, sales via class A shares—traditionally the primary share class pricing structure through which brokers and financial advisers sell funds—continue to accelerate toward sales done at NAV (without any type of front-end sales load), the study found. During 2009, 68% of A-share sales among fund managers primarily selling through financial advisers were made at NAV, which means they carry no front-end “load” or commission, up from 66% of A-share sales in 2008 and 58% in 2007. 

A shares sold at 4% or higher commissions declined to just 13% of total A-share sales in 2009, down from 14% of total A-share sales in 2008 and 16% in 2007. Even this low proportion was influenced by a handful of fund managers still relying more significantly on high-commission A shares, as evidenced by the median firm in its survey garnering just 8% of total A-share sales at these high commission levels in 2009, SI said. 

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“These sales trends in A shares are being driven by the evolving way that financial advisers sell mutual funds to their clients,” said Strategic Insight senior analyst Dennis Bowden, the study report’s lead author, in a press release. “Mutual fund sales are moving away from high-commission model models as more funds are sold in a structure where advisers receive fees for advice. As this trend continues, fund sales through share classes without a front-end sales load will also continue to expand.” 

While sales at NAV continued to make up an increasingly dominant portion of total A-share sales, overall fund sales through A shares (both with a front-end load and without) continued to decline during 2009—accounting for 40% of total mutual fund sales among survey participants—down from 43% in 2008 and 46% in 2007. In total, A shares continued to be the single largest-selling class of fund shares among survey participants. 

On a dollar-for-dollar basis, A-share sales at NAV fell 11% in 2009 from 2008 levels, while commissionable A shares (sold with any type of front-end load) contracted by 21% year-over-year. This decline in A-share sales was driven particularly by a decrease in sales of A shares at NAV within fee-based advisory programs (including mutual fund wrap platforms). 

A shares at NAV accounted for 46% of total fee-based advisory sales among fund managers primarily selling through financial advisers during 2009, down from 56% of such sales during 2008. Meanwhile, no-noad shares accounted for 54% of total fee-based advisory sales during 2009, up from 44% in 2008. 

These findings come from SI’s new report, “The Strategic Insight 2009 Fund Sales Survey: Perspectives on Intermediary Sales by Distribution Channel and Share Class.” The study was based on SI’s proprietary survey of 32 fund firms that distribute primarily through financial advisers. Survey participants managed in aggregate $3.3 trillion in U.S. open-end stock and bond fund assets as of the end of 2009, representing roughly half of industry-wide long-term fund assets.


More information is available at www.sionline.com.

IMHO: Grecian 'Formula'

While the markets were in an apparent freefall last week, I could hear former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulsen on the TV in the next room telling (lecturing?) the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

Paulsen was telling the panel that the problems that led to the 2008 meltdown could, and should, have been dealt with sooner, and that we could, and should, have moved faster—and with more to stave off the crisis.  The criticism then—as it was last week in Europe—was that this was a time to act, not to think; that if we didn’t act—act now, act decisively, and without question—well, the results would be catastrophic. 

It is a theme that runs through Paulsen’s recent book, “On the Brink,” as he drags the reader from one impending crisis to another during those fateful weeks of 2008.  In Paulsen’s retelling, those who back his “need for speed” are thoughtful and prescient; those who don’t, well, their motivations are generally painted as either blinded to the seriousness of the situation or hopelessly ideological.  From the former Goldman Sachs CEO’s perspective, we weren’t bailing out Wall Street, we were saving the very financial system itself (though he was willing to let the politicians claim that they were saving jobs).  And perhaps we were, so we set aside our doubts and concerns, gave the experts what they said they needed—and plenty of it—and hoped they knew what they were doing.

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Now, in fairness, the financial system did stabilize and the markets did—eventually—return to some semblance of normality.  Until ….

Now I, perhaps like many of you, am not yet quite sure what to make of the crisis bubbling in Greece, much less the response of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and what that might mean to us.  But the chorus—we must act, act now, act decisively, and without question, or else—well, it’s a little too familiar to those of us who thought we had already been there, done that.  But, once again, we’re told that if we don’t, things will get worse, much worse—and we’re (again) afraid that’s not an exaggeration.

Déjà View

But make no mistake: There are some clear and disturbing parallels between this “rescue” and the ones that have gone before.  Once again you have a sudden infusion of apparent wealth on paper that fueled a borrowing binge that fueled a spending spree that fueled more borrowing, until things reached a point where the system was no longer willing to loan money (despite lucrative fees)—at which point, the whole thing should fall apart.  But at that point the outstanding debt is so large that that same system that empowered that situation now claims that failure is not an option. It’s not just that bank, or that automobile company, or that country…it’s all the other things that depend on them….

We’ve seen this before—and more than once—from investment banking to the foreclosed house down the street.

Now, if this was your compulsive gambler of a brother-in-law on the wrong side of another “can’t miss” bet that put him (and perhaps your sister) in trouble with his bookie’s “collection agency,” you’d doubtless bail him out, and insist that he check into rehab (at least the first time).  Indeed, that’s what the Greek “austerity plan” is all about: raising the retirement age to 63 (from 61), freezing pay and cancelling year-end bonuses for public-sector workers (no simple thing that, when something north of a third of the population works for the government), hiking the nation’s VAT to 23% from 21%, and cutting retirement pensions by 14% (by some accounts, those pensions currently provide an 80% replacement ratio, adjusted for wage inflation). 

This, of course, is also what set off those riots in Greece last week—and the concerns about what that portends for the implementation of this new bailout, and its ability to stem the tide, took a bit of “austerity” out of all of our retirement security last week.      

Once again politicians have been led (many willingly and happily) down the primrose path by so-called financial experts—told that there was, after all, a free lunch; lured into a sense of complacency and then, abruptly, told something else.  It is a formula that has, again, taken us to what is being painted as a pivotal point, a crisis beyond which a chasm lies.  We worry—that they are right, that it won’t be the last, that we’re not doing enough, or that we’re doing too much – again. 

And then, somewhere in the dim reaches of consciousness perhaps, we realize that the folks telling us what we absolutely have to do now—without thinking, without questioning, without hesitation—look suspiciously like the folks who got us into this mess in the first place.

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