“The
overriding mission is to remind policymakers, investors and practitioners why fiduciary
responsibility is important,” says Knut Rostad, president of the Institute for
the Fiduciary Standard. The month kicks off at 2 p.m., Thursday,
September 4, with a conference call: “The State of Financial Regulatory
Reform: Wall Street versus The Fiduciary Duty and Core Investor Protections;
Where We Are and What’s Ahead.”
Other calls are particularly relevant to retirement plan advisers, Rostad tells
PLANADVISER, such as “Best Practices: What Are They, Why We Need Them,” which will be held at
2 p.m. on September 11. “Panelists will be discussing the need for and general principles
around what best practices should look like,” he says.
Rostad
will be on the call with Blaine Aikin, president and CEO of fi360; James
Watkins, an attorney and CEO of Investsense.com; and Chris Cannon, CIO of First
Financial and a board member of the institute on the Best Practices Board. The
call can be joined free of charge, no registration, by calling 1-857-232-0159, code 626004.
“It is critical
for anyone who holds himself out as a fiduciary to be reminded of some basic
principles in terms of what being a fiduciary means,” Rostad says. “In terms of
best practices there are three areas. One is the transparency of fees and
expenses, the second is conflicts of interest, and the third is communicating
clearly and completely. I recognize that sounds so basic; but if you look at
where a lot of folks are falling short, it’s precisely in those areas.”
Another call, “Restoring
Investor Trust in Wall Street, with Broker/Dealers and Investment Advisers,”
will take place 2 p.m., September 8, with John Taft of RBC Wealth Management,
Michael Falk of Focus Consulting Group, and Jack Waymire of Paladin Registry. David
Armstrong of WealthMangement.com will be the moderator. (Conference number and
code above.)
“Many
investors have put advisers on probation,” Rostad says. “They are not fully
confident in advisers generally, including their own adviser. That’s the
overriding issue that we’re trying to bring attention to, the investor concern and
distrust that is seeping into their views of advisers.”
Fiduciary
September was established by the
institute in 2012 to focus on the importance of fiduciary principles and
practice of investment advice, Rostad says. Throughout the month, other calls will address restoring trust,
fiduciary best practices, the regulatory landscape in Washington and the
resulting burgeoning pressures on fiduciary advisers in the marketplace. More
information is on the institute’s
site.
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Court Blocks DC Plan Participant Claims Against Madoff Trustee
A federal bankruptcy judge has affirmed the denial
of recovery claims from retirement plan participants who indirectly invested in
the now-infamous Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein of the Unites States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with a lower
court ruling finding that participants in the retirement plans were not
“customers” of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) and thus, are
not entitled to recovery. Bernstein cited another case in finding: “The fact
that Individual Claimants participated in defined contribution plans, to which
they could contribute their own money, does not change the fact that title to
this money passed to their plan when they made such contributions. Participants’ ability to control the size of their investments, withdrawals,
and rollover funds, and to choose among a limited set of investment
alternatives is not equivalent to having a direct financial relationship with
or directly entrusting one’s own funds to a broker/dealer, or exercising sole
control over investment decisions. Nor is any awareness of or contact with the
claimants on the part of BLMIS equivalent to the kind of ‘repeated business
dealings’ associated with customer status.”
As explained in a 15-page memorandum decision written by
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein, some of the victims of Madoff’s
record-breaking Ponzi scheme did not invest directly with Madoff’s firm.
Instead, they invested in third-party funds, sometimes called feeder funds, and
the feeder funds then invested some of all of their assets with Bernard Madoff
Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS), the firm at the heart of the massive Ponzi
scheme.
Despite the absence of a direct relationship with BLMIS,
court documents show many of the feeder fund investors have submitted claims as
“customers” of BLMIS to the trustee overseeing the ongoing liquidation of
BLMIS. As judge Bernstein observes, the liquidation process is being conducted
according to the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), which provides
certain options for recourse to defrauded customers of investment management
firms.
In
essence, SIPA allows defrauded customers to file claims with a SIPA-appointed
trustee to get back some or all of their fraud-related losses. In this case,
the federal government appointed Irving Picard as the trustee tasked with
directing the liquidation of Madoff’s investment companies.
The current decision comes from trustee Picard’s request to
the bankruptcy court to affirm his determination denying 308 claims filed by
defined contribution (DC) plan participants who had invested in plans regulated
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The participants
belonged to one of four retirement plans: the Daprex Profit Sharing and 401(k)
Plan, the Felsen Moscoe Company Profit Sharing TST DTD, Sterling Equities
Employees Retirement Plan, and the Orthopaedic Speciality GRP PC Defined
Contribution Pension Plan.
Picard originally denied the claims because the individuals did not have personal accounts with BLMIS, which led to some 210
outstanding docketed objections. Court documents show the trustee served
discovery requests on each of the claimants’ objections, focusing on their
alleged customer status and requesting key pieces of information.
According to court documents, none of the claimants
associated with the Felsen Plan, the Sterling Plan or the Orthopaedic Plan
responded to the trustee’s request, thereby forfeiting their SIPA claims.
Claimants at the Daprex Plan did respond, however, and denied that they did not
directly hold an account at BLMIS, which would preclude them from seeking a
return of assets through the SIPA trustee.
Their argument was that the name of the Daprex Plan’s
account at BLMIS indicated it was a profit sharing plan, and hence, that the
funds in the account belonged directly to employees at Daprex. They also denied
that they had never received correspondence directly from BLMIS.
As
Judge Bernstein observed, the disposition of the current motion depended on
whether the claimants could legally be considered “customers” of BLMIS within
the meaning of SIPA. The text of SIPA defines customers as “any person
(including any person with whom the debtor deals as principal or agent) who has
a claim on account of securities received, acquired, or held by the debtor in
the ordinary course of its business as a broker or dealer from or for the
securities accounts of such person for safe keeping, with a view to sale, to
cover consummated sales, pursuant to purchases, as collateral security, or for
purposes of effecting transfer.”
The SIPA law further defines customers as “(i) any person
who has deposited cash with the debtor for the purpose of purchasing
securities; (ii) any person who has a claim against the debtor for cash,
securities, futures contracts, or options on futures contracts received,
acquired, or held in a portfolio margining account carried as a securities
account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the [Securities
and Exchange] Commission; and (iii) any person who has a claim against the
debtor arising out of sales or conversions of such securities.”
Bernstein suggested the customer status of persons who
invest in feeder funds, whether as part of an ERISA plan or not, has already
been addressed in a previous bankruptcy court ruling related to the Madoff
Ponzi scheme, known as the Feeder Funds Decision, (708 F.3d 422). In
that matter, another set of investors had purchased interest in funds organized
under Delaware limited partnership law that subsequently invested assets with
BLMIS. The investors did not have their own distinct accounts at BLMIS, but
nevertheless filed customer claims, which trustee Picard denied.
The bankruptcy and district courts affirmed the trustee’s
determination, and the investors appealed to the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals (see "Participants in ERISA-Regulated Plans Cannot Recover Funds From Madoff"). The 2nd Circuit went on to affirm the decision, explaining that the
“critical aspect” of the customer definition is “the entrustment of cash or
securities to the broker/dealer for the purposes of trading securities.”
As explained by the 2nd Circuit, investors in the feeder
funds failed to satisfy this critical requirement because they “(i) had no
direct financial relationship with BLMIS; (ii) had no property interest in the
assets that the feeder funds invested with BLMIS; (iii) had no securities
accounts with BLMIS; (iv) lacked control over the feeder funds’
investments with BLMIS; and (v) were not identified or otherwise reflected in
BLMIS’s books and records.”
This
determination, according to court documents, depended on an earlier 2nd Circuit
decision in SIPC v. Morgan, Kennedy & Co. In that case,
employee-investors participated in a company profit sharing plan pursuant to
which a trust fund was created and maintained through employer contributions.
The trust established an account with the debtor in the name of the plan’s
trustees, and the trustees controlled all investment decisions and communicated
directly with the debtor. The trust maintained separate accounts for each
employee in its own records, but crucially, the names of employee-beneficiaries
did not appear on the debtor’s books and records.
The 2nd Circuit also denied in SIPC v. Morgan,
Kennedy & Co. that each of the three trustees was a customer in
the SIPA sense. Instead, the trust itself was determined to be the true
customer. This was important, court documents show, because the maximum amount
of SIPA-related recovery depends on the number of parties jointly holding an
account.
In the Feeder Funds Decision, investors
attempted to distinguish their situation from the SIPC v Morgan case
by arguing that they maintained a higher degree of control over the feeder
funds’ investments in BLMIS. The court disagreed on the merits, and also ruled
that such control, even had it been established as fact, would be insufficient
to confer customer status.
Judge Bernstein writes that the SIPC v. Morgan,
Kennedy & Co. decision has important ERISA-related consequences that
also apply in the current ruling. He notes ERISA funds are similar to feeder
funds because the participant invests in a plan that subsequently invests some
or all of the plan’s assets with a broker/dealer, here BLMIS.
In SIPC v. Morgan, Kenney & Co., the
individual plan participants attempted to distinguish their employer-funded
profit plans from the plans at issue in the Feeder Fund Decision. They
argued that they had contributed their own money to their plans; they could
control the size of their investments or withdraw or roll them over; their
plans kept track of the precise value of their investments; they received
statements reflecting the value of their investments; they were known to BLMIS
due to its own reporting requirements; they had actual contact with BLMIS; and
they could choose among alternatives when directing their plans to invest their
respective shares of the plans’ assets.
The district judge concluded that even these true facts did
not make the participants BLMIS customers and affirmed the trustee’s
determinations denying their customer claims—a decision approved by the 2nd
Circuit.
The
text of the most recent bankruptcy court decision is here.