Cerner Corporation Targeted in Excessive Fee Suit

Repeating a number of excessive fee lawsuits filed, the complaint says the defendants did not try to “reduce the plan’s expenses or exercise appropriate judgment to scrutinize each investment option that was offered in the plan to ensure it was prudent.”

An excessive fee lawsuit has been filed against Cerner Corporation, its Foundations Retirement Plan, several committees and various other alleged fiduciaries.

Repeating a number of excessive fee lawsuits filed, the complaint says the plan, which has more than $2 billion dollars in assets, qualifies as a large plan in the defined contribution (DC) plan marketplace, and, therefore, has substantial bargaining power regarding the fees and expenses charged. The lawsuit says the defendants did not try to “reduce the plan’s expenses or exercise appropriate judgment to scrutinize each investment option that was offered in the plan to ensure it was prudent.”

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The plaintiffs allege that from January 21, 2014, to the present, the defendants breached their Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) fiduciary duties by failing to objectively and adequately review the plan’s investment portfolio with due care to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of cost; and maintaining certain funds in the plan despite the availability of identical or similar investment options with lower costs and/or better performance histories.

In an effort to avoid the timing or standing issues that have hindered other such suits from going forward, the complaint states that the plaintiffs did not have knowledge of all material facts necessary to understand that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and engaged in other unlawful conduct in violation of ERISA until shortly before the suit was filed. In addition, it says the plaintiffs did not have and do not have actual knowledge of the specifics of the defendants’ decision-making process with respect to the plan “because this information is solely within the possession of defendants prior to discovery.”

“Having never managed a large 401(k) plan such as the Plan, Plaintiffs lacked actual knowledge of reasonable fee levels and prudent alternatives available to such plans. Plaintiffs did not and could not review the Committee meeting minutes or other evidence of Defendants’ fiduciary decision making, or the lack thereof,” the complaint adds.

In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that passively managed funds cost less than actively managed funds, institutional share classes cost less than investor share classes, and collective trusts and separate accounts cost less than their “virtually identical” mutual fund counterparts. They claim that the defendants knew or should have known of the existence of cheaper share classes and/or collective trusts, and should have immediately identified the prudence of transferring the plan’s funds into these alternative investments.

The complaint states that as a large plan, it had sufficient assets under management at all times during the class period to qualify for lower share classes which often have a million dollars as the minimum for a particular fund. “Investment minimums for [collective trusts] are often $10 million, but will vary,” the complaint notes.

It also accuses the defendants of failing to monitor or control the plan’s recordkeeping expenses. The lawsuit alleges the plan fiduciaries failed to track the recordkeeper’s expenses by demanding documents that summarize and contextualize the recordkeeper’s compensation, such as fee transparencies, fee analyses, fee summaries, relationship pricing analyses, cost-competitiveness analyses, and multi-practice and standalone pricing reports.

It accuses the defendants of failing to identify all fees, including direct compensation and revenue sharing being paid to the plan’s recordkeeper. “To the extent that a plan’s investments pay asset-based revenue sharing to the recordkeeper, prudent fiduciaries monitor the amount of the payments to ensure that the recordkeeper’s total compensation from all sources does not exceed reasonable levels, and require that any revenue sharing payments that exceed a reasonable level be returned to the plan and its participants,” the plaintiffs claim.

The suit alleges the defendants failed to remain informed about overall trends in the marketplace regarding the fees being paid by other plans, as well as the recordkeeping rates that are available by not conducting a request for proposals (RFP) process at reasonable intervals, and immediately if the plan’s recordkeeping expenses have grown significantly or appear high in relation to the general marketplace.

“As a direct and proximate result of the breaches of fiduciary duties alleged herein, the Plan suffered millions of dollars of losses due to excessive costs and lower net investment returns,” the complaint says.

The Consolidation Stars Remain Aligned in 2020

The advisory, insurance and asset management industries have never been so ripe for consolidation, merger and acquisition experts agree.

Both Fidelity and PwC have recently published new research analyzing the ongoing wave of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the financial services industry.

According to PwC’s reporting, the industry has never been so ripe for consolidation. The firm cites “fundamental challenges” to the sector’s business models and pricing structures that will “probably trigger another wave of consolidation in coming quarters.”

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Fidelity’s analysis reaches similar conclusions, showing 74% of firms that have recently made acquisitions or entered into a merger are planning to conduct more M&A activity in the future.

According to PwC, in addition to advisers and recordkeepers, other subsets of the financial services industry are seeing their own consolidation pressures. For example, the firm projects that 20% of mutual fund asset managers will be acquired or eliminated by 2025.

“Although the industry is growing on the whole, assets are becoming increasingly concentrated among a handful of top players,” the firm explains. “We expect that trend to continue. In order to survive, active managers who experience significant investor withdrawals will need to evolve or, more likely, consolidate. We believe that managers should expect fee compression to intensify as equity markets cool down.”

PwC says fee pressures are leading to strategic shifts among top providers.

“Several large discount brokerages eliminated commissions on stock and ETF trades during the third quarter of 2019, following the lead of Charles Schwab,” PwC reports. “This fundamental shift in business model triggered the sale of TD Ameritrade to Charles Schwab in November in an all-stock transaction of about $26 billion. A deal of this magnitude may not occur in 2020. Still, we expect to see another round of consolidation and deals involving discount brokerages of all sizes.”

Indeed, a number of brokerages have said publicly in recent months that they are open to a combination or other strategic alternatives, PwC reports.

Another M&A trend to watch in 2020 is the convergence of asset managers and insurers.

“While this trend is not new, we have seen an acceleration of transactions between the two sub-sectors in both directions,” PwC reports. “We expect asset managers to acquire insurance companies in an effort to boost assets under management. Such deals would also provide a stable source of capital and a long-term stream of fees.”

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