DOJ Sues to Block Aon/Willis Towers Watson ‘Oligopoly’

The Department of Justice says Aon’s acquisition ‘would create a broking behemoth,’ breaking apart the ‘Big Three’ insurance brokers.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed a civil antitrust lawsuit to block Aon’s proposed $30 billion acquisition of Willis Towers Watson (WTW), a transaction that would bring together two of the “Big Three” global insurance brokers. The largest broker currently is Marsh McLennan, which owns Mercer, followed by Aon and WTW.

Meanwhile, WTW and Aon issued a statement saying the DOJ’s action “reflects a lack of understanding of our business, the clients we serve and the marketplaces in which we operate.”

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The firms add that the combination will “accelerate innovation on behalf of clients, creating more choice in an already dynamic and competitive marketplace.” WTW and Aon say the pandemic’s impact has underscored “the need to address similar systemic risks, including cyber threats, climate change and the growing health and wealth gap which our combined firm will more capably address.”

The DOJ’s complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, says the merger would eliminate competition, raise prices and reduce innovation for American businesses, employers and unions that rely on the brokers’ services. More importantly, the complaint alleges, it would reduce the companies’ insurance choices for health benefits and commercial risk broking. The DOJ says it has “significant concerns.”

Attorney General Merrick B. Garland said in a statement, “Today’s action demonstrates the Justice Department’s commitment to stopping harmful consolidation and preserving competition that directly and indirectly benefits Americans across the country. American companies and consumers rely on competition between Aon and Willis Towers Watson to lower prices for crucial services, such as health and retirement benefits consulting. Allowing Aon and Willis Towers Watson to merge would reduce that vital competition and leave American customers with fewer choices, higher prices and lower quality services.”

The DOJ points out that America’s largest companies rely on Aon and WTW to “craft and administer health and retirement benefits, and to keep their costs down by managing complex and evolving risks. They compete head-to-head to provide these services, which helps ensure businesses obtain innovative, high-quality broking services to manage their risks and provide critical health and retirement benefits to their employees at a reasonable cost. As the complaint alleges, the merger would eliminate this important competition in five markets, resulting in higher costs to companies, higher costs to consumers, and decreased quality and innovation.”

The DOJ goes on to say that thousands of America’s largest corporations—along with their customers, employees and retirees—rely on Aon and WTW for “global service, sophisticated data and analytics, and a breadth and depth of knowledge and expertise that other brokers do not offer. As alleged in the complaint, Aon and [WTW] operate ‘in an oligopoly’ and ‘will have even more [leverage] when [the] Willis deal is closed.’”

The DOJ says that while WTW and Aon have agreed to “certain divestitures in connection with investigations by various international competition agencies, the complaint alleges these proposed remedies are inadequate to protect consumers in the United States.”

The Department of Justice’s press release notes that “the complaint also alleges the U.S.-focused divestitures in health benefits and commercial risk broking, in particular, are wholly insufficient to resolve the department’s significant concerns.”

Aon, incorporated in Ireland and headquartered in London, has 50,000 employees operating out of 120 countries, with more than 100 offices in the U.S. It reported revenues of more than $11 billion last year.

WTW is also incorporated in Ireland and has its HQ in London, with approximately 45,000 employees operating out of more than 80 countries. It has more than 80 U.S. offices. In 2020, WTW reported revenues of more than $9 billion.

When Aon and WTW first announced the proposed merger in March 2020, the companies said that upon close of the transaction, 63% of the combined company would be owned by Aon shareholders and 37% by WTW shareholders. It said the joint company would be called Aon and would be based in London.

Under the proposal, each Willis Towers Watson share would be exchanged for 1.08 shares of Aon at a fixed exchange ratio. The total consideration of $231.99 per WTW share would be based on Aon’s closing stock price on March 6, 2020. This implied a premium of 16.2% to WTW’s closing share price on March 6, 2020.

Mixed Ruling Issued in MetLife Mortality Table ERISA Lawsuit

The retirees’ main claim is that the plan’s use of mortality tables from 1971 and 1983 to convert default retirement benefits into the alternative benefits that they opted to receive constitutes unreasonable actuarial assumptions.


The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has published an order in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) lawsuit filed against MetLife by a proposed class of retirees who were formerly employed by the company. In basic terms, the order grants in part and denies in part a motion to dismiss the lawsuit that had been filed by the MetLife defendants, who argued the plaintiffs lacked standing in this matter.

The arguments in the complaint consider the topic of the “actuarial equivalence” of different types of annuity benefits to be paid under the current and former plan designs of MetLife’s own pension plan—in particular, it questions the method of calculating joint and survivor annuity benefit payments as compared with single annuity benefit payments.

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According to plaintiffs, MetLife is failing to pay the full promised value of alternative benefits available under its Metropolitan Life Retirement Plan. The complaint suggests MetLife is failing to meet its obligations to ensure different annuity options under the plan are actuarially equivalent to the plan’s default benefit, as required under ERISA and the terms of the plan itself. In essence, the retirees argue the firm is using severely outdated mortality tables from 1971 and 1983 to convert default retirement benefits into the alternative benefits they opted to receive—in this case, a joint and survivor annuity.

Before discussing the factual background that bears on the legality of the alternative benefits offered by the plan in this case, the District Court reviews the statutory framework in which the issue arises. For example, it notes how ERISA requires that defined benefit (DB) plans provide a qualified joint and survivor annuity and a qualified optional survivor annuity to qualified participants and beneficiaries. As the court explains, both forms of alternative benefits must be “the actuarial equivalent of a single annuity for the life of the participant.” The court also observes that regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Treasury direct employers to use “reasonable actuarial factors” to determine the actuarial equivalence of qualified joint and survivor annuities.

Turning to the factual background in the case, the order states that the MetLife plan, with respect to these non-standard annuities, applies actuarial assumptions based on a set of mortality tables and interest rates to calculate a benefit amount that purports to be actuarially equivalent to the accrued single life annuity benefit.

“In other words, the conversion factor, according to which a single life annuity is converted into another form, has two main components: an interest rate and a mortality table, which is a series of rates which predict how many people at a given age will die before attaining the next higher age,” the order states.

From here, the order provides detailed background about the savings experiences of various lead plaintiffs, who have had their benefit calculations run according to mortality tables created in either 1971 or 1983 and with interest rates of either 6% or 5%. For context—and as identified in the complaint—life expectancies have increased substantially since the 1980s, while interest rates have fallen to near 0. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants’ use of these mortality tables to calculate the amounts of non-standard annuities decreases their present value, in violation of ERISA’s requirement that such alternative benefits be “actuarially equivalent” to the plan’s standard option.

The order then considers and rules on the defense’s counterarguments.

“According to the defendants’ first argument for dismissal, the complaint’s purported lack of guidance as to what would constitute a range of reasonable actuarial assumptions, against which to compare the assumptions used by the plan, constitutes a failure to plausibly allege that any harm stems from the plan’s mortality assumptions,” the ruling states. “The plaintiffs maintain that the complaint demonstrates injury by comparing their current benefits to the amount they would receive were those benefits converted with updated mortality tables. This court is not persuaded that the absence of specifications as to what conversion factors or range of assumptions would be considered reasonable—or would be necessary for actuarial equivalence—constitutes a fatal defect mandating dismissal of the complaint.

“The plaintiffs claim that the plan’s use of decades-old mortality tables violates a specific provision of ERISA, namely the Section 205 requirement that covered joint and survivor annuities be actuarially equivalent to the standard annuity from which they were converted,” the ruling continues. “The complaint also refers to the more contemporary mortality tables used by the Society of Actuaries as examples of available reasonable alternatives. The court finds that these allegations provide sufficient context of the nature of the relief sought. Simply put, the plaintiffs seek to reform the plan by replacing the 1971 and 1983 mortality tables with more current ones. … Requiring the plaintiffs to further specify what set of assumptions would be reasonable would impose a pleading standard that is more stringent than that required by either ERISA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Later, the order makes the following observation: “Broadly speaking, some limits on the discretion of plan administrators in the selection of actuarial methodology are necessary to effectuate the protective purposes of ERISA, as recognized by the Second Circuit. The alternative interpretation, in which administrators have free reign to fashion the assumptions used to calculate actuarial equivalence, would permit all kinds of mischief inconsistent with that purpose. Allowing plans to set their own definition of actuarial equivalence would eliminate any protections provided by that requirement. … Consistent with that standard, numerous district courts have denied motions to dismiss actions challenging the use of purportedly unreasonable actuarial assumptions, which were not alleged to violate any other provision of ERISA.”

The defense’s only point of success in the ruling is explained by the court as follows: “Defendants correctly argue that [the plaintiffs’] claims for fiduciary breach are subject to a different standard for determining the accrual date. Pursuant to ERISA Section 413, no action may be commenced, with respect to a fiduciary’s breach of any responsibility, duty or obligation, more than six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation, or three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation. In this case, the alleged fiduciary breach occurred with the selection of the outdated mortality tables as conversion factors, or the conversion of the plaintiff’s retirement benefits with those tables. That breach must have taken place prior to November 15, 2012, when the lead plaintiff selected retirement benefits that had already been converted under the challenged formula. As the lead plaintiff received his first payment under the plan on December 1, 2012, the court can also reasonably infer that he had knowledge of the alleged fiduciary breach as of, or soon after, that date, i.e., more than three years before filing his complaint. His claim of fiduciary breach must therefore be dismissed as untimely.”

The full text of the ruling is available here.

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