Allergan Stock Drop Challenge Blames Fiduciaries For Losses

For claims alleging a fiduciary breach based on non-public information, the high court has held that plaintiffs must plausibly allege an alternative action fiduciaries could have taken and would not have viewed as more harmful to the plan than helpful.

Plaintiffs have filed a class action challenge against the Allergan, Inc. Savings and Investment Plan and the Actavis, Inc. 401(k) Plan,  claiming breaches pursuant to Sections 404, 405, 409 and 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

According to the compliant, “this case is about the failure of the defendants, fiduciaries of the plan, to protect the interests of the plan’s participants in violation of the defendants’ legal obligations under ERISA.” Defendants, the complaint argues, “breached the duties they owed to the plans, to plaintiff, and to the putative class members who are also participants, by, inter alia, retaining common stock of Allergan as an investment option in the plans when a reasonable fiduciary using the ‘care, skill, prudence, and diligence … that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use’ would have done otherwise.”

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The complaint suggests defendants “permitted the plans to continue to offer Allergan Stock as an investment option to participants even after the defendants knew or should have known that Allergan Stock was artificially inflated during the class period,” which runs February 25, 2014, to November 2, 2016.

“Defendants knew or should have known that material facts about Allergan’s business had not been disclosed to the market, causing Allergan Stock to trade at prices above which it would have traded had such facts been disclosed,” plaintiffs argue. “Defendants were empowered as fiduciaries to remove Allergan Stock from the plan’s investment options or to take other measures to help participants, yet they failed to do so or to act in any way to protect the interests of the plans or their participants, in violation of defendants’ legal obligations under ERISA.”

As with other stock drop cases, participants may not find it as easy as they expect to prove standing, even with the well-established fact that they clearly did suffer significant financial losses as a result of continuing to hold Allergan stock. While the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Fifth Third vs Dudenhoeffer that there should be no special presumption of prudence for employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) fiduciaries, “allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized from publicly available information alone that the market was over- or under-valuing stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of special circumstances.” In addition, for claims alleging a fiduciary breach based on non-public information, the high court held that plaintiffs must plausibly allege an alternative action fiduciaries could have taken and would not have viewed as more harmful to the plan than helpful.

It is up to the United States District Court District Of New Jersey to decide in this particular case whether there was indeed such a plausible alternative action available to fiduciaries. Plaintiffs, among other arguments, suggest the fiduciaries here had a duty at the very least to freeze the offering of the “falsely inflated securities.”

NEXT: Does the argument have merit? 

The complaint frequently cites the decision in Fifth Third to argue ESOP fiduciaries cannot rely on a “presumption of prudence” to defend their offering of employer stock. Other cases with similar allegations have resulted in both successful and unsuccessful defenses for the employers, hinging mainly on whether the party filing suit could successfully allege another plausible action that a prudent fiduciary should have known to take.

Attempting this, the text of the lawsuit takes a deep dive into Allergan’s business practices, examining a long series of releases and regulatory filings that plaintiffs suggest proves the company behaved in a willingly misleading way.

“During the class period, the company made a series of reassuring statements about Allergan’s engagement in conduct that would eventually result in an antitrust investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice and subject it to likely criminal charges for suspected price collusion,” the complaint suggests. “Given the totality of circumstances prevailing during the class period, no prudent fiduciary could have made the same decision as made by defendants here to retain and/or continue purchasing the clearly imprudent Allergan Stock as a plan investment.”

Specifically, plaintiffs argue their plan fiduciaries should have known the company “was conspiring to raise its profits in violation of antitrust laws. Rather than continue to make short-term profits at the risk of long-term fines and penalties, defendants should have taken action to protect the plan from holding and purchasing artificially inflated stock.”

Plaintiffs admit that “disclosure might not have prevented the plan from taking a loss on company stock it already held, but it would have prevented the plan from acquiring … additional shares of artificially inflated company stock … Full disclosure would have cut short the period in which the plan bought company stock at an inflated price … None of those steps would have violated securities laws or any other laws, or would not have been more likely to harm the plan’s stock holdings than to help it, and could have avoided or mitigated harm caused to the plan.”

Plaintiffs go so far as to suggest defendants should have known to redirect company and plan contributions from the company stock to be held “in cash or some other short-term investment.” They suggest “a refusal to purchase company stock is not a transaction within the meaning of insider trading prohibitions and would not have required any independent disclosures that could have had a materially adverse effect on the price of Allergan Stock … Alternatively, defendants could have disclosed (or caused others to disclose) Allergan’s legal issues so that its stock would trade at a fair value.”

To remedy the breaches of fiduciary duties as described in the complaint, plaintiffs “seek to recover the financial losses suffered by the plan as a result of the diminution in value of company stock invested in the plan during the class period, and to restore to the plan what participants would have received if the plan’s assets had been invested prudently.”

The full text of the complaint is here

Shift from DB to DC Resulted in Decline in Income Replacement

Retirement income as a percentage of wealth has declined as the employer-sponsored retirement plan landscape has been moved to mostly DC plans, a study finds.

Researchers from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College note the shift from a defined benefit (DB) employer-sponsored retirement plan landscape to a defined contribution (DC) plan landscape and question whether this shift has made households better or worse off.

Using data from the 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative survey of older Americans, and a sample including both single individuals ages 51 to 56 and couples in which at least one spouse was 51 to 56, the researchers found DB wealth in all years is higher than DC wealth. DB wealth is roughly constant over time, while DC wealth nearly doubled between 1992 and 2010. “Combine these patterns with the shift in coverage from DB to DC between 1992 and 2010, and the result is relatively level retirement wealth over time,” the researchers wrote in an Issue Brief.

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However, they note that stable aggregate retirement wealth does not necessarily imply that households today are as well prepared for retirement as those in 1992. “Preparedness depends on how retirement wealth is distributed, how much income that wealth produces, and how that income relates to pre-retirement wages,” the paper says. The research found that DC plan wealth is skewed more toward those with more education and higher earnings, with the top quartile holding 52% of total DC wealth in 2010 compared to 35% of DB wealth. 

The researchers explain that the yield on DB wealth in recent years has been higher than that on DC wealth, because DC plan participants face two disadvantages when turning wealth into income: while DB participants face actuarially fair annuities, DC participants have to buy annuities on the open market where marketing and other costs reduce annuity factors by about 15% to 20%; and the interest rate used to calculate commercial annuity rates has declined sharply since 1992, while the interest rate assumption for DB annuities is a steady 5.8%. 

NEXT: Lower retirement income as a percentage of wealth

The research found retirement income at projected retirement ages as a percentage of wealth for those ages 51 to 56 in households with a plan was 12.5% in 1992 and 11.7% in 2010.

Given the growth of DC wealth and the disadvantages of annuitizing that wealth, one might have expected an even greater decline in the ratio of retirement income to current retirement wealth, the researchers note. They explain that the main reason the ratio did not decline more is that overall retirement ages have been increasing, and the difference in the retirement age between those in DC and DB plans has been getting larger. “Later retirement ages, all else equal, produce more annuity income per dollar of retirement savings because payout periods are shorter for people who work longer. Indeed, if the analysis had instead assumed that everyone retired at 62 over the entire period, the ratio of income to wealth would have declined much more sharply,” the paper says.

The researchers concluded that employer-sponsored plans are providing less income today than in the past. They suggest this outcome could be improved by making 401(k) plans work better through auto-enrollment, auto-escalation of default contribution rates, and reduced leakages; and expanding coverage to workers whose employers do not offer a plan.

The full issue brief may be downloaded from here.

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