Retirement
plan participation and deferral rates both rose again, according to the 2016 PLANSPONSOR Defined Contribution (DC) Survey, as did the percentage of plans
with immediate eligibility and immediate vesting. Some could argue that such
changes are within the survey’s margin of error, but the five-year trend for
these values shows a growth rate that is unquestionably positive
For plan
sponsors, benchmarking plans is more relevant than ever, considering avoiding
lawsuits, attaining and retaining employees and contending with budgetary and
investment pressures.
Comparing
plans, or benchmarking, usually falls into one of three categories: 1.) Fee
benchmarking, 2.) Hunting for best practices, and 3.) Competitive/peer
benchmarking.
When benchmarking fees, sponsors look to ensure that the fees they are paying
into their plan are reasonable. Best practices typically focus on improving
participation and deferral rates, in order to drive better outcomes. And
looking at what competitors are doing vis-à-vis their plan is typically with an
eye to retaining and attracting key talent.
This year’s
survey found that plans have a median participation rate of 86%, with
participants saving a median of 6.5%. Seventy-nine percent of plans permit
their participants to take out loans, and 37% allow their participants to begin
participating in their plan immediately upon hire. Forty-two percent of plans
automatically enroll their employees into the plan, and when they do, 66% use atarget-date fund (TDF) as the default investment.
A full
three-quarters, 75%, of plans offer a company match, and slightly more, 76%,
offer some form of investment advice. Fifty-eight percent of sponsors have figured
out what provider fees have been in the past 12 months, and 68% use a financial consultant
or adviser. Only 31% are confident that their employees will reach their
retirement goals by age 65.
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Familiar Arguments In New JP Morgan ERISA Challenge
JPMorgan Chase Bank is now the target of another ERISA
challenge against its own 401(k) plan, this one leveling many of the same
complaints against the company found in a previous lawsuit.
The 401(k) retirement plan offered by JPMorgan Chase Bank to
its own employees is now the target of a second Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) lawsuit, this one filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
The main crux of the challenge, labeled Orellana vs JP Morgan, is very similar
to the previous suit filed in late January. According to the lead
plaintiff, who is seeking class certification for other similarly situated plan
participants, the JP Morgan plan sponsors “violated their fiduciary duties by
larding the plan with proprietary fund investment options that charged excessively
high fees that inured to the benefit of affiliates of JPMorgan and one of
JPMorgan’s closest business partners, BlackRock Institutional Trust Company,
N.A. (“BlackRock”), at the expense of plan participants.”
Plaintiffs argue that, instead of acting for the exclusive
benefit of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries, “defendants acted
for the benefit of themselves—by forcing the plan into costly investments
managed by JPMorgan and BlackRock. Rather than engage in a systematic,
arm’s-length review of available Plan investment options, JPMorgan sought out
investment options that allowed its affiliates and business partners to reap
outsized fees to the detriment of plaintiff and members of the Class. During
the Class Period (defined herein), half of all Plan investment options were
affiliated with JPMorgan entities, while more than 70% were affiliated with
either JPMorgan or BlackRock.”
Those retirement industry professionals closely following ERISA litigation will recognize
many of the themes called up in this complaint—and they will probably disagree with many of them. For example, the complaint bemoans
the inclusion of active management funds and argues their inclusion robbed
investors of an opportunity to save on fees by investing passively. This is despite the well-established
standard that investments have to be reasonably priced, rather than the
cheapest possible, to meet the requirements of prudence and care under
ERISA.
This is how the plaintiffs make the case: “These funds were
also actively managed, and therefore charged higher fees, even though passively
managed investment options were available that would have allowed plan beneficiaries
to utilize similar strategies during the class period at a significantly lower
cost. For most of the class period, these JPMorgan-affiliated investment options
were the priciest in the plan. For example, the JPMIM-managed Mid Cap Growth
Fund charged fees of 0.93%, while the Vanguard Mid-Cap Growth Index Fund
Admiral also utilized a mid-cap growth strategy and had an annualized expense
ratio of only 0.08%.”
For its part, JP Morgan tells PLANADVISER, “We are reviewing the complaint. We disagree with the fundamental allegations in the complaint and believe the case is without merit.”
NEXT: Reading further
into the complaint
The complaint goes on to argue that, “instead of conducting
arm’s-length negotiations to offer the best investment options at the lowest
cost, JPMorgan gave preferential treatment to its longtime business partner, BlackRock,
in selecting Plan investment options … Defendants favored furthering JPMorgan’s
business relationship with BlackRock over the interests of Plan beneficiaries
by choosing excessively expensive BlackRock-managed funds for the plan and by
funneling a large portion of the Target Date Funds, which made up 9 of 30
investment options, into BlackRock-managed funds.”
Plaintiffs suggest that, during the class period, JPMorgan-
and BlackRock-affiliated funds constituted over 70% of all plan investment
options.
“On January 25, 2017, in a stunning example of their
tight-knit business relationship, BlackRock shifted $1 trillion of its assets
under management into JPMorgan custody, in one of the largest asset transfers
of all time. JPMorgan will reportedly earn tens of millions of dollars in annual
fees from this arrangement,” plaintiffs posit.
The text of the complaint also calls out JP Morgan’s previous
difficulties starting in 2014 with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) compliance
related to “the funneling of client assets into JPMorgan-affiliated funds rather
than third-party investment options in order to generate investment fees.” The suggestion is that similar patterns played out within the firm's own retirement plan.
“As intense scrutiny fell on JPM Bank’s self-dealing as a
result of the SEC investigation,” plaintiffs claim, “JPM Bank began to
belatedly reduce the fees charged by its proprietary funds and by BlackRock
funds to plan beneficiaries, and in some cases eliminated these investment
options altogether. For example, effective November 6, 2015, the Mid Cap Growth
Fund, a JPMIM-managed fund that was the most expensive plan option, was
eliminated from the plan in favor of the S&P Mid Cap 400 Index Fund. Fees
for this mid cap investment option subsequently plummeted from 0.93% to 0.04%,
a 96% reduction. Similarly, the Core Bond Fund and the Small Cap Core Fund,
both actively managed by JPMIM, were restructured into a lower cost collective
trust and a lower cost separate account, respectively.”
Additional examples are cited by the plaintiff, driving to
the conclusion that, “while the regulatory scrutiny and uncovering of
systematic self-dealing and fiduciary breaches by JPM Bank and other JPMorgan
affiliates has spurred much needed expense reform in the plan, plan
beneficiaries had already paid tens of millions of dollars in excessive fees
during the class period.”