Advisory Firm Warns of Unmitigated Indexing Risks

One advisory firm doubts the wisdom of relying entirely on indexed products and portfolios.

After years of increasing attention and use by institutional investors, practitioners across the retirement plan industry are likely familiar with the positive features of index funds. As the fiduciary duty prescribed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) mandates close attention for fee issues, it’s no surprise low-cost index funds—which also generally feature better transparency—have grown in popularity among retirement plan advisers and sponsors.

One firm, however, argues that “the rush of money into index equity funds has officially ballooned into a market mania.” Wintergreen Advisers is far from the first advisory firm to push back against purely passive investment strategies, but its stance takes an interesting (if somewhat vitriolic) perspective on what makes overzealous indexing precarious.

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A new analysis from Wintergreen, appropriately titled “How the Votes of Big Index Funds Feed CEO Greed and Put Americans’ Retirement Savings in Peril,” estimates that passive U.S. equity funds gathered an impressive $167 billion in assets in 2014, ending the year with about $2.2 trillion in assets under management (AUM). Wintergreen suggests the growth has been fueled by “huge advertising and PR budgets” among some of the largest and well-known index fund providers—and that the lion’s share of these assets are indexed to the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500.

“All told, the three giants control more than $8 trillion of assets, much of it in passive investment strategies,” Wintergreen reports. “Students of market history know that index mania—like other market fads before it—will not end well.”

David Winters, CEO of Wintergreen Advisers, adds that trillions of ordinary investors’ dollars are now committed to “a mechanistic strategy that, day in and day out, simply buys stocks without a thought for their actual underlying value.” As the research explains, since the S&P 500 is market-capitalization weighted, “it suffers from the flaw of being driven by momentum.” This means rising markets cause more money to flow into the biggest companies, which drives their prices higher, which triggers more buying by passive index funds, on and on until the bear arrives.

Of course investors want to see market growth and growth within their indexed portfolios, Winters says, but the analysis suggests this pumping pattern has investors continuing to pour dollars into index funds “in the gravely mistaken belief they’re enjoying a virtually free lunch.”

“The sad reality is that index funds have turned ordinary investors into the pawns in a game that undermines the integrity of American markets and imposes costs on society that don’t show up in index fund expense ratios,” the report claims. “We believe that one consequence of this is that billions of dollars of value created by American companies are being diverted to a select few executives [of S&P 500 companies], while ordinary investors, distracted by ‘low fee’ hype, are subjected to dangerous risk concentrations in their retirement portfolios.”

Next: What’s the problem with indexing? Concentration and governance. 

The research goes on to suggest the massive assets of “Big Index” providers make them the largest block of shareholders in America’s largest publicly traded companies. Wintergreen’s analysis shows that the three biggest index fund providers hold a combined average of 16% of the shares outstanding of the top 25 companies in the S&P 500.

The research makes some subtle arguments for why these massive holdings are problematic from a governance and concentration perspective—basically, the problem is that the mega passive investment shops are not leveraging their weight as top shareholders to drive good governance and business practices among the companies into which indexed dollars eventually flow. Wintergreen specifically points to problems in CEO compensation and risk concentration among top companies in the S&P 500 Index that it feels could eventually derail the strong ongoing growth for indexers.

Wintergreen’s analysis of the voting histories of the leading S&P 500 index funds run by Vanguard, BlackRock and State Street, for example, finds that over the past five years for the 25 largest companies in the S&P 500, these firms’ funds cast their votes in favor of management equity compensation plans 89% of the time, and opposed executives’ pay packages less than 4% of the time. “They withheld or cast votes against directors a meager 4% of the time,” the report continues.

Liz Cohernour, chief operating officer (COO) of Wintergreen Advisers, says this means a significant block of the shareholders in a given S&P 500 company “can generally be counted on to support executive compensation packages, even when shareholders are receiving meager returns.” The report goes on to suggest that it’s unlikely for the top index fund providers to suddenly take a more active shareholder role, given the strength of their inflows under the current way of doing business.

Meanwhile, the Wintergreen report also suggests that “index hype creates an illusion of safety and diversification.” By Wintergreen’s estimate, the top 25 securities by market value in the S&P 500 in 2014 contributed over 33% of the index’s total return, while the top 25 securities by performance contributed 55% of the index’s total return. Apple, Microsoft, Facebook and Intel alone accounted for over 20% of the total return of the S&P 500 in 2014.

Beyond this potentially harmful risk and return concentration, the report says, thousands of companies are overlooked and left by the wayside in indexed portfolios: “They are deemed to be less desirable for no reason other than the fact that they are not included in the [underlying] index … Business valuations and fundamentals have seemingly ceased to matter, with stock prices largely determined by momentum. Somewhere, Ben Graham, the father of value investing, is rolling over in his grave.”

While the momentum-driven style of passive investing has worked well over the past six years, leading retirement plan fiduciaries to ask how to leverage the best of active and passive, Wintergreen warns that these gains are almost entirely predicated on the fact that the U.S. market has been on a “nearly relentless upward trajectory.”

It remains to be seen how a year of market losses could shake the trend. As the report concludes, “The flood of cash into passive investments without regard for any sort of underlying fundamental analysis of valuation leads to a continued emphasis on companies or sectors that are popular—since they are performing well, as long as the flows into passive funds continue, they must continue to go up. But what will happen to investors when the music stops and the punch bowl is taken away? We believe that the same small group of companies that have led the market's rise will likely be among the biggest losers, as passive funds are forced to sell the largest and most liquid names in the index.”

The full report is available for download at www.wintergreenadvisers.com

 

How to Help a Plan With a Nondiscrimination Fail

“[ADP/ACP failure] really depends on how long the plan has been in existence, and whether or not the plan administrator has had any experience running a 401(k) plan in the past.”

And that is where retirement plan advisers can really help their plan sponsor clients, says Geno Cufone, senior vice president, retirement administration, at Ascensus in Dresher, Pennsylvania. When it comes to actual deferral percentage (ADP) and actual contribution percentage (ACP) testing, he says, retirement plan advisers really need to be advocates for their plans. “Encourage employers to monitor the [nondiscrimination] testing on an ongoing basis—encourage them to send in complete census information on an ongoing basis so that they have the best opportunity to monitor throughout the year, as opposed to being surprised at the end of the year.”

Small-plan sponsors in particular may not be aware of the nondiscrimination testing requirements, or may not keep their recordkeeper up to date with the plan’s census data. “Especially with start-up plans, plans that have just begun, there does seem to be a surprise element, more often than not,” he comments. Advisers can recommend that sponsors have their recordkeepers test their plans mid-year to see where participants fall. “The more information that they provide … to the recordkeeper, the better prepared we can make them, to ensure that they don’t fail.”

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According to a recent survey from Judy Diamond Associates, nearly 60,000 401(k) plans failed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)’s nondiscrimination testing, and 12% of 401(k) plans issued corrective distributions in 2012.

“Once [plans] fail, they have two options: They can return monies back to the highly compensated employees [HCEs]” via a corrective distribution, Cufone says. “Basically, there’s a calculation that determines how you get the plan to pass by returning money.” That option is by far the more common course of action, he says, taken by 85% to 90% of employers that do fail.

The other possibility is a one-time, nonelective employer contribution to the non-highly compensated employees (NHCEs). However, he warns, “unless you’ve budgeted for it, or if you happened to have a good year, from a financial perspective, it is typically something that employers aren’t prepared to do.”

 Next: The factors that determine if a plan is ready for the next round…

Three factors determine whether or not the plan will be prepared for the next round of testing: plan design, employee behavior and continuous monitoring.

“The plan design is by far the best way to get to a point where more employers are passing their nondiscrimination testing, but you have to consider whether or not they have the wherewithal to afford doing some type of employer match,” Cufone says.

According to Cufone, automatic enrollment provides the best opportunity to use plan design to get non-highly compensated employees into the plan, to offset the contributions of the highly compensated employees. If rank-and-file workers are not making sufficient deferrals, though, employee behavior may need to change. One, admittedly unpopular, choice is to ask HCEs to cut down their deferrals. “Ask them to contribute a little bit less if they know that [otherwise] they’re going to be getting a refund,” Cufone suggests

The best thing for the plan and for participants, he says, is to “influence the non-highly compensated employees to contribute more if you see that you’re falling within the range where, potentially, you’re going to fail.” Advisers can help their clients to send out targeted communications to urge participants to increase their deferrals. “We know it’s in their best interest to contribute more to the plan, and you get the added benefit of having a greater opportunity to pass your nondiscrimination testing.”

Advisers may also suggest that the plan adopt a safe harbor employer contribution. “If you can afford to do that, choosing a safe harbor basic employer match will eliminate the need for testing altogether,” Cufone says. “Offering a safe harbor match contribution—which is 100% of the first 3% that employees defer, and then 50% of the next 2% that they defer—eliminates the need for both ADP and ACP testing. And you get the added bonus of not having to do top-heavy testing as well. Another option is to offer a 3% nonelective contribution to all employees in the plan, regardless of whether or not they’re contributing. By doing that, you no longer have to do any of the required testing.”

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