Envestnet has announced that it will
enhance the level of integration within MoneyGuidePro, offering advisers scalable
tools to gather the information they need to determine clients’ best
interests based on risk tolerance, investment objectives and specific retirement needs.
These
variables define what a client’s best interest is according to the standards set out by the Department
of Labor (DOL) fiduciary rule.
With the expansion, MoneyGuide Pro, Best Interest Scout and
myMoneyGuide by PIEtech will be available to Envestnet advisers and enterprises.
These solutions can confirm if the proper information is available to evaluate
the need for a best interest contract (BIC), and align advice to comply with
the new regulations from the DOL’s fiduciary rule, Envestnet explains. Advisers will also be able to record
and archive data obtained through Best Interest Scout and myMoneyGuide.
“The post-DOL landscape will be a
very different one for members of the wealth management industry, and advisers
have their hands full preparing for the new rules to take effect,” says Kevin Knull, president of
PIEtech. “Our ongoing integration with Envestnet can help advisers
seamlessly make necessary adjustments in their practices so they can both
strengthen engagement with clients and ensure all advice they offer is in each
client’s best interest.”
The MoneyGuidePro
offerings are also available to registered-investment advisers (RIAs)
leveraging Envestnet Tamarac’s Advisor View and its client portal. RIAs who believe
they need more information about a client’s risk tolerance, investment
objectives and retirement needs to determine best interest can send an email
asking the client to log into Best Interest Scout through the Advisor View
client portal. When the client logs in, Tamarac will import known client data
into Best Interest Scout, which will ask the client to enter the unknown
information and send the completed questionnaire back to the adviser.
Best Interest Scout’s scalable client
discovery process, integrated with Envestnet data aggregation, will
streamline data transfer into Envestnet’s core platform. The firm notes it is
critical to have a thorough understanding of a client’s financial situation
that goes beyond a risk questionnaire and also takes into account factors such
as market timing, liquidity, employment, and current health conditions that
could create variables to a client’s long-term investment horizon.
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Another participant is suing Wells Fargo and its executives after
losing money on company stock following revelations involving unethical sales
practices within the organization’s consumer/retail banking divisions.
Like the previous complaints, this one seeks
class action status under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
and alleges that the executives within Wells Fargo who oversee the company’s
retirement plan—and its offering of Wells Fargo stock to employees as an
investment option—knew about the sales process failures well in advance of the
public disclosures. Thus, according to the reasoning in the complaint, they
should have dropped the company stock as an imprudent investment option—knowing
the illegal sales processes would eventually and necessarily be disclosed and
thereby correct the inflated stock price.
The text of the complaint lays out by-now
familiar allegations that the company’s aggressive sales requirements for
low-level banking professionals directly inspired the opening of millions of
unauthorized customer accounts. This resulted in a major backlash against the
company that has cut roughly 12% to 15% of Wells Fargo stock’s market value
compared with this time last year. The company faces separate civil penalties
approaching $200 million—with additional fines likely on the way.
“Based on their knowledge, defendants were duty-bound by ERISA
to prevent harm to the plan and its participants from undisclosed and/or false
material information that they knew or should have known had made Wells Fargo
stock and the stock fund an imprudent investment for retirement purposes,”
plaintiffs suggest. “They knew or should have known that the plan was harmed
with every purchase made of the stock fund at inflated prices, and that the plan’s
large holdings of Wells Fargo stock were at risk for a sizeable downward price
correction when the truth finally and inevitably emerged.”
The complaint suggests defendants could have halted new
contributions or investments into the Wells Fargo Stock Fund without running
afoul of insider-trading restrictions. As in the first
two stock-drop lawsuits filed, this will be a critical point in any trial
deliberations.
“The act of preventing any new purchases of the Wells Fargo
Stock Fund is not illegal insider trading under the federal securities laws because
no transaction would occur and no insider benefit would be received by anyone,”
plaintiffs argue. “Defendants would simply have to ensure that neither
purchases nor sales of the Wells Fargo Stock Fund would be permitted during the
time that the freeze was in place. However, taking this action would have
prevented serious harm to the plan by at least preventing additional purchases
of stock fund shares at inflated prices.”
NEXT: Additional insider trading
arguments
“Defendants could also have tried to effectuate, through personnel
with disclosure responsibilities, or, failing that, through their own agency,
truthful or corrective disclosures to cure the fraud and make Wells Fargo stock
a prudent investment again,” plaintiffs argue. “Defendants also could have
directed the plan to divert a portion of its holdings into a low-cost hedging product
that would at least serve as a buffer to offset some of the damage the company’s
fraud would inevitably cause once the truth came to light … Defendants could
not reasonably have believed that taking any of these actions would do more
harm than good to the plan or to plan participants.”
Plaintiffs conclude that the longer fraud at a public
company like Wells Fargo persists, the harsher the correction is likely to be
when that fraud is finally revealed.
“Economists have known for years that when a public company
like Wells Fargo prolongs a fraud, the price correction when the truth emerges
is that much harsher, because not only does the price have to be reduced by the
amount of artificial inflation, but it is reduced by the damage to the
company’s overall reputation for trustworthiness as well,” the complaint says. “Some
experts estimate that reputational damage can account for as much as 60% of the
price drop that occurs when a fraud is revealed. This figure, moreover,
increases over time. So, the earlier a fraud is corrected, the less
reputational damage a company is likely to suffer ... Such a consideration
should have been in the forefront of defendants’ minds once they knew (or
should have known) that Wells Fargo’s stock price was artificially inflated by
fraud.”
In fact, the complaint goes on to argue that the issuance of
corrective disclosures was required by the federal securities laws, not prohibited.
“By the very same mechanism that Wells Fargo could have used
to make corrective disclosures to the general public under the federal
securities laws, it could also have made disclosures to Plan participants,
because Plan participants are, after all, part of the general public,”
plaintiffs suggest. “Defendants did not have to make a special disclosure only
to plan participants, but could simply have sought to have one corrective
disclosure made to the world and thereby simultaneously satisfied the
obligations of the federal securities laws and ERISA.”