Court Refuses to Apply New Test for Top Hat Plans

The court rejected the argument that “bargaining power” of participants is a requirement for a plan to be considered a “top hat” plan.

A former employee of a Pennsylvania non-profit cannot rely on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for benefit protections as the plan in which he participated is a “top hat” plan, a court found.

Noting that a non-qualified deferred compensation plan under Section 457(f) of the Internal Revenue Code must be maintained primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees, U.S. District Judge Mark R. Hornak of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania looked to a 3rd Circuit case which said “the plan must cover relatively few employees . . . [and] the plan must cover only high level employees.” The non-profit UPMC provided evidence that from 2007 through 2011 the number of plan participants ranged from 16 to 68. During that time, the total number of UPMC employees ranged from 37,965 to 48,731, so the absolute highest percentage of employees participating in the plan was .14%. Hornak concluded this was “relatively few.”

Never miss a story — sign up for PLANADVISER newsletters to keep up on the latest retirement plan adviser news.

According to the court opinion, UPMC’s Non-Qualified Supplemental Benefit Plan limits participation to “key executives selected by the Committee,” and the primary factors in selecting those key executives are their influence within the organization and their ability to impact its performance. UPMC provided a comprehensive listing of the job titles of plan participants and they include various presidents, vice presidents, and other chief and senior officials. UPMC also argued that the compensation of these employees makes certain their “high level status.” Eligibility to participate in the plan is limited to those whose incentive levels under the separate management incentive plan are at least 20% of their salary. During the relevant period, the average compensation of plan participants was roughly $500,000 per year. Hornak concluded these employees were “very handsomely compensated by any measure.”

However, the plaintiff in the case, Paul F. Sikora, argued there is another element to determining whether a plan is a top hat plan: bargaining power of participants. Sikora points to the Department of Labor (DOL) Advisory Opinion Letter 90-14A, in which the DOL says, “It is the view of the Department that in providing relief for ‘top hat’ plans from the broad remedial provisions of ERISA, Congress recognized that certain individuals, by virtue of their position or compensation level, have the ability to affect or substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the design and operation of their deferred compensation plan, taking into consideration any risks attendant thereto, and, therefore, would not need the substantive rights and protections of [ERISA].”

NEXT: Bargaining power not an element in determining top hat plan status

Hornak noted there has not been one federal court that has applied “bargaining power” as an element in determining whether a deferred compensation plan is a top hat plan that is exempt from ERISA coverage. He agreed with a 1st Circuit opinion, which said not only is that letter not entitled to deference, it is merely a description of the purposes that the DOL thought Congress likely had in mind when enacting the top hat exemption.

Earlier this year, the DOL reiterated its stance about top hat plans in an amicus brief filed for another lawsuit. In June, another district court judge decided the issue of participants’ influence on the plan should be decided at trial.                            

Hornak said even if the court were to accept that the letter adds bargaining power to the list of elements in determining top hat plan status, the letter itself says top hat plan participants are presumed to be able “to affect or substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise” the design and operation of their plan. He concluded that the DOL recognized that top hat plan participants have other means besides direct negotiation to affect or influence the plan design. For example, they could threaten to leave the company if they weren’t happy with the terms or operation of the plan.

Sikora, a vice president at UPMC, was a participant in the non-profit’s supplemental benefits plan from 2008 until he voluntarily terminated his employment with UPMC in 2011. Sikora applied for a lump-sum distribution of his account balance and says he never received a written decision from the plan committee.

He kept pursuing the distribution throughout 2012, and eventually received a letter from the committee informing him that all rights and benefits allegedly due to Sikora had been forfeited because Sikora had not entered into a written Post Retirement Service Agreement. The plan committee maintained that the plan is a “top hat” plan for purposes of ERISA and therefore exempt from the vesting and non-forfeiture provisions of that law. Sikora then filed the lawsuit.

Court Looks Beyond Simple Meaning of Church Plan

Catholic Health Initiatives has won a lawsuit challenging its pension plan's church-plan status.

U.S. District Judge Robert E. Blackburn with the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado has found that Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI) is a “church” for purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA’s) church-plan exemption.

The plaintiff in the case Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives argued that the court should use the plain meaning of “church” as simply “a house of worship.” But, Blackburn said reliance on a plain meaning interpretation ignores other plain meanings of the term “church,” which evince richer and more meaningful denotations and connotations of that term. He said it is equally plain that the term “church” can and may be used to denote “the whole body of Christian believers,” or “any division of this body professing the same creed and acknowledging the same ecclesiastical authority,” as well as an “ecclesiastical organization, power, and affairs, as distinguished from the state.”                           

For more stories like this, sign up for the PLANADVISERdash daily newsletter.

Blackburn found these broader conceptions of the term find parallels in definitions of the Roman Catholic Church in particular. “Under this more resonant definition, the court has little trouble in concluding that CHI is, at the very least, a constituent part of the Catholic Church,” he wrote in his opinion.

Investigating the history of CHI, Blackburn found that in June 1991, the Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life, a department of the Holy See in the Vatican, approved a petition to confer public juridic personality on Catholic Health Care Federation (CHCF). The opinion explains that public juridic persons are the official constitutive parts of the Catholic Church and the primary means through which the Church acts in the world. However, they are creatures of canon law, and thus have no ability to act or own property in the United States on their own. To do so, they require a civil law counterpart.

CHI was formed in 1996 through the consolidation of three health care systems representing 10 congregations of Catholic sisters. It is expressly “organized and operated . . . exclusively for the benefit of, to perform the functions of, and/or to carry out the religious, charitable, scientific, and educational purposes . . . of Catholic Health Care Federation.”  In other words, Blackburn said, “as conceived by the Church itself, CHCF and CHI are seen as the church and civil counterparts of a single entity.”

NEXT: DB plan committee has ties to the Catholic Church

In addition, Blackburn noted, CHI is listed in The Official Catholic Directory, “the definitive compilation of Roman Catholic institutions in the United States.”  And, in an Internal Revenue Service General Counsel Memorandum in July 1, 1983, the agency said, “[a]ny organization listed in [The Official Catholic Directory] is considered associated with the Roman Catholic Church in the United States,” and an employee of any such organization “is considered as an employee of the Roman Catholic Church of the United States for purposes of the church plan rules.” 

Blackburn also found CHI’s ties to the Catholic Church extend downward to its defined benefit plan subcommittee, which manages and administers the plan. All members of the subcommittee are appointed by CHI’s governing body, the Board of Stewardship Trustees (BOST). All expenses of plan administration are paid by CHI.

In administering the plan and carrying out its duties, a document governing the subcommittee says it must “be mindful of the Employer’s Philosophy and Mission, and the teachings and tenets of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Sponsoring Congregations of Catholic Health Initiatives.” Blackburn says this shows the subcommittee plainly is “associated” with the Catholic Church.

He concluded that CHI is a church for purposes of ERISA section 1002(33)(A), because the evidence more than adequately demonstrates that the CHI Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1002(33)(C), which says a plan may qualify for the church-plan exemption if it is “maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.”

A number of lawsuits have challenged retirement plan’s church-plan status. The courts have issued differing opinions in the cases. The three cases finding against “church plan” status for the defendants have appealed to the 9th, 3rd, and 7th Circuits. In the Medina case, Blackburn rejects a recommendation by a U.S. magistrate judge that the court enter a declaratory judgment holding that the CHI Retirement Plan is not a church plan within the meaning of ERISA, as well as a declaratory judgment holding that the CHI Plan must comply with ERISA, to the extent that it currently does not comply.

«

 

You’ve reached your free article limit.

  You’re out of free articles!! 

Subscribe to a free PW newsletter - get free online access!

 Don’t leave before subscribing! 

If you’re a subscriber, please login.