Following its issuance of a final rule on partial annuity
distribution options in defined benefit plans (DBs), the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has just issued model amendments including language that DB
sponsors might want to use when offering such options.
To facilitate the payment of benefits partly in the form of an annuity and
partly as a single sum, the Department of the Treasury and the IRS amended the
regulations to simplify how sponsors would calculate the payments, in order to
encourage sponsors to offer participants the additional option of an annuity.
Their objective was to protect participants with an annuity in the event of
unexpected longevity. The participant can decide to divide his benefit into two
or more portions, and the IRS offers sponsors two methods to compute how the
benefits would be distributed.
In addition, for pre-approved plans, some portions of the
model amendment may be included in the basic plan document and others may be
included in the adoption agreement.
However, the IRS is also allowing plan sponsors to limit how
the bifurcation is handled. For example, sponsors may limit bifurcation to only
two forms. They could also set certain percentage parameters, such as 50/50 or
75/25. Sponsors could also limit bifurcation for the portion of an accrued
benefit earned before a specific date and the portion earned after that date.
The IRS’s notice on model amendments to add bifurcated
distribution options to DB plans can be downloaded here.
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Three U.S. pension funds have filed a lawsuit against a group of
the world’s biggest investment banks including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Credit Suisse, UBS and Bank
of America, over practices having to do with the lending of stocks.
The lawsuit alleges that the banks conspired to block
competition in the securities lending marketplace through a variety of means.
It may be helpful for readers to note that the lending of
stock by major asset holders (such as large pension plans, both public and
private) is typically involved in short selling and other
areas of the hedge fund marketplace. Retirement systems that hold a lot of
stock on long-term plays will often lend their stock out to a short seller for compensation,
using one of the large banks named in the suit as a middle man.
The arguments presented in the new litigation, submitted to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, suggest the
major providers in the marketplace for securities lending have colluded and purposefully
allowed the market to remain inefficient and opaque. The plaintiffs argue the
providers have inappropriately worked together and structured the marketplace
so that investors cannot clearly and efficiently find out who has different
stock available for lending purposes and where the demand for borrowing specific
stocks exists. Plaintiffs say they are also effectively prevented
from being able to determine the prospective prices of these stock exchanges,
given the influence of the providers named.
According to the plaintiffs, the large banks have created
and fostered the opacity of the marketplace in order to prevent borrowers and
lenders from working together directly and to thereby protect/maximize their own
interests as a broker of securities lending arrangements. In doing this they have allegedly worked together behind
the scenes to fend off previous attempts by clients and competitors to make the
market more efficient. One example of how the defendants have done this,
according to the complaint, was by forming a joint project called EquiLend LLC,
through which the banks allegedly purchased and shelved key intellectual
property of potential competition.
As is noted in the complaint, today there is approximately $1.72
trillion worth of securities on loan, and this has become a very
important part of the wider financial marketplace. Simply put, there are many hedge funds that want to borrow stock and a lot of pension funds that want
to loan their stock, but there is no real way for these groups to match
themselves up without having to use the big banks as a conduit.
It should be noted that hedge funds often have their own
interest in maintaining confidentiality, so it is far from clear that it would be
as easy a matter to create more transparency in the securities lending
marketplace as the plaintiffs seem to suggest. Hedge funds, many of them, will
be loath to publicly broadcast their desired holdings even if they did not have to use the big banks as a go-between.
Beyond this, the plaintiffs might also have trouble
establishing the class action standing they are seeking. In the federal court
system, to prove that a complaint can succeed as a class action, plaintiffs must prove
numerosity, commonalty and typicality. Because these stock lending transactions
are all structured and papered somewhat differently, it will be particularly challenging for the
plaintiffs to prove typicality.