Four Advocate plan participants allege in a lawsuit filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that the
organization’s retirement plan is not a church plan as defined in ERISA Section
3(33)(A) because it was not “established and maintained by” a church or by a
convention or association of churches and were not maintained for employees of
any church or convention or association of churches. In addition, the lawsuit
says the Advocate plan does not qualify as a church plan under Section
3(33)(C)(i) because it is not maintained by any entity whose principal purpose
or function is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the
provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both.
The participants contend that even if the Advocate plan had
been “established” by a church and even if the principal purpose or function of
Advocate was the administration or funding of the Advocate plan (instead of
running a hospital conglomerate), the plan still would not qualify as a church
plan under ERISA Section 3(33)(C)(i) because the principal purpose of the plan
is not to provide retirement or welfare benefits to employees of a church or
convention or association of churches. “[T]he approximately 33,000 participants
in the Advocate Plan work for Advocate, a non-profit hospital conglomerate.
Advocate is not a church or convention or association of churches and its
employees are not employees of a church or convention or association of
churches within the meaning of ERISA,” the complaint says.
The
lawsuit notes that under ERISA Section 3(33)(C)(ii) an employee of a tax exempt
organization that is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention
or association of churches also may be considered an employee of a church. It
points out this part of the definition merely explains which employees a church
plan may cover once a valid church plan is established, but Advocate is not
controlled by or associated with a church or convention or association of
churches within the meaning of ERISA. Advocate is not controlled by a church or
convention or association of churches, it is not owned or operated by a church
and does not receive funding from a church, and it is not “associated with” a
church or convention or association of churches within the meaning of ERISA,
the complaint says.
According to the lawsuit, the Advocate plan is a cash
balance plan because it computes accrued benefits by reference to hypothetical
accounts balance or equivalent amounts and is therefore required to comply with
the special rules for cash balance plans, including but not limited to ERISA
Section 203(f)(2), which requires that any employee who has completed at least
three years of service has a non-forfeitable right to 100% of the employee’s
accrued benefit derived from employer contributions. Unrelated to the church
plan issue, the participants contend currently the plan is being operated in
violation of ERISA because it requires participants in the plan to complete
five years of service to be vested.
Another Court Rejects Pension’s ‘Church Plan’ Status
A federal court refused to dismiss a lawsuit against
Saint Peter’s Healthcare System, holding that its retirement plan is not a
“church plan” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
U.S. District Judge Michael A. Shipp of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey determined a church plan must be
established by a church per ERISA Section 3(33)(A). Shipp also found case law
used by Saint Peter’s in its arguments to be unpersuasive, and said the court
could not give deference to a private letter ruling by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) which determined Saint Peter’s pension plan is a church
plan.
Shipp said it is clear Congress intended for a church plan
to be established by a church. He pointed out ERISA Section 3(33)(A) says
“[t]he term ‘church plan’ means a plan established and maintained . . . by a
church or by a convention or association of churches . . . .” Shipp noted that
in subsection C(i), Congress expanded the maintenance requirement outlined in
subsection A to include plans maintained by a tax-exempt organization; however,
the statute still requires that the plan be established by a church or a
convention or association of churches. “In other words, if a church does not
establish the plan, the inquiry ends there. If, on the other hand, a church
establishes the plan, the remaining sections of the church plan definition are
triggered,” Shipp wrote in his opinion.
According to Shipp, if the court were to accept Saint
Peter’s interpretation, any tax-exempt organization can establish its own
pension plan, maintain it, and then employ the church plan exemption by
purporting to be controlled by or associated with a church. “Defendants’ contention
in this regard is unreasonable. The Court cannot conclude that Congress
intended to create this slippery slope, especially considering that the point
of enacting ERISA was to promote the interest of employees and their
beneficiaries.”
Shipp found the case law relied upon by Saint Peter’s, Thorkelson
v. Publishing House of Evangelical Lutheran Church, is unpersuasive. InThorkelson,
plaintiffs made the same arguments—that the benefit plan for defendant Augsburg
Fortress Publishers (AFP), a non-profit publisher for the Lutheran Church, was
not a church plan because it was sponsored by AFP. However, the Thorkelson court concluded that
AFP’s plan was a church plan exempt from ERISA. Shipp said the court focused
its statutory analysis on whether the plan was sponsored by a tax-exempt entity
that is controlled by or associated with a church and did not apply ERISA
Section (33)(A), which requires a plan to be established by a church.
Shipp
found a recent court’s ruling for the case Rollins v. Dignity Health is
in accord with his decision (see “Court Weighs In
on Church Plan Issue”). In that case, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California applied the same reasoning as Shipp to rule the
Dignity Health pension plan is not a church plan.
Saint Peter’s argued that Thorkelson is in
alignment with thirty years of judicial decisions (see “Church Plan
Lawsuits Could Reverse 30 Years of Precedent”), but Shipp replied that none
of these previous decisions undertook a detailed statutory analysis of the
church plan definition as the judge did in the Rollins decision.
He also noted that both parties seek refuge in the
legislative history by pointing particularly to comments made on the
congressional floor that purportedly support their reading of the statute.
However, he cited court findings that “where the text of a statute is
unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written and ‘[o]nly the most
extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will
justify a departure from that language,’” and “The law is what Congress enacts,
not what its members say on the floor.”
According to the court opinion, for more than thirty years,
Saint Peter’s pension plan was operated as an ERISA plan and complied with
ERISA’s requirements regarding funding, reporting, and insurance premiums paid
to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC)—and represented such to its
employees via plan documents and other written materials. However, in 2006,
Saint Peter’s filed an application for church-plan status with the IRS. The
organization notified employees of its application for church-plan status in
November 2011. On August 14, 2013, in a private letter ruling, and despite five
pending lawsuits questioning other health care organizations’ church-plan
status, the IRS concluded that Saint Peter’s plan is a church plan as defined
by ERISA (see “Disagreement
Voiced on IRS Church Plan Ruling”).
Shipp conceded that dozens of IRS private letter rulings
have held that a church-related agency can establish its own church plan. In
addition, the Department of Labor (DOL) has issued advisory opinions on
church-related agencies, concluding that their plans are church plans. He noted
that Advisory Op. 94-04A found “In accordance with Section 3(33)(C)(iii) . . .
the Church is deemed the employer of these individuals for purposes of the
church plan definition in section 3(33); and the Church, as employer, is deemed
to have established and to maintain the Plans.”
Saint
Peter’s argued that, “though not binding on the Courts, [these rulings] are
entitled to deference in accord with their persuasive power” to the extent that
they are reasonable and consistent with the text and legislative history.
Defendants concede that courts and agencies interpret the church plan
definition differently, but maintain that agency decisions are entitled to
deference. In addition, defendants assert that congressional silence regarding
the church plan definition gives agency decisions the force of law.
But, Shipp said although Saint Peter’s has received a
private letter ruling, the court cannot give it deference for several reasons.
For one, the ruling conflicts with the plain text of the statute and is
therefore unreasonable, he noted, citing a court ruling which found “The
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent.” Additionally, Shipp said, the IRS private letter ruling is conclusory,
lacking any statutory analysis, and cannot be used as precedent because the
ruling was issued in a non-adversarial setting based on information supplied by
Saint Peter’s.
He added courts have long held that congressional silence,
alone, in the wake of administrative rulings does not give the rulings the
force of law. “The church plan definition has not been amended since 1980 and
Defendants cannot now use congressional silence to turn agency rulings into
law,” he wrote.
According to Saint Peter’s, its plan is a church plan exempt
from ERISA because it and its retirement plan committee, charged with
maintenance of the plan, are controlled by and associated with the Roman
Catholic Church, as outlined under ERISA Section 3(33)(C)(i), and its employees
are considered employees of the Roman Catholic Church under Section
3(33)(C)(ii)(II).
The plaintiff in the case, Laurence Kaplan, contends Saint
Peter’s does not receive funding from the Catholic Church or other religious
entities but, instead, relies on revenue bonds to raise money. His principal
grievance is that Saint Peter’s is improperly maintaining its plan to the
detriment of its employees, using church-plan status to evade ERISA’s various
requirements including underfunding the plan by more than $70 million. He
alleges various ERISA violations, including violations of requirements for
reporting and disclosure, minimum funding, establishment of a trust, and
fiduciary duties.
Kaplan is seeking, among other things, an order declaring
that the plan is not a church plan exempt from ERISA or, in the alternative,
that the church plan exemption is an unconstitutional accommodation under the
Establishment Clause. Since the court found the plan is not a church plan, it
found it unnecessary to address a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
The
opinion in Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Health Care System is here.